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ARTICLE 
THE VANISHING COMMON LAW JUDGE? 
NEAL DEVINS† & DAVID KLEIN†† 
The common law style of judging appears to be on its way out. Trial courts rarely 
shape legal policymaking by asserting decisional autonomy through distinguishing, 
limiting, or criticizing higher court precedent. In an earlier study, we demonstrated 
the reluctance of lower court judges to assert decisional autonomy by invoking the 
holding–dicta dichotomy. In this Article, we make use of original empirical research 
to study the level of deference U.S. district court judges exhibit toward higher courts 
and whether the level of deference has changed over time. Our analysis of citation 
behavior over an eighty-year period reveals a dramatic shift in judges’ practices. In 
the first fifty years included in our study, district court judges were not notably 
deferential to either their federal court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court. District 
court judges regularly assessed the relevance and scope of precedents from those higher 
courts and asserted their prerogative to disregard many of them. Since then, judges 
have become far more likely to treat a given higher court precedent as dispositive. In 
so doing, lower courts have embraced a hierarchical view of judicial authority at odds 
with the common law style of judging. The causes of this shift are multifold and likely 
permanent; we discuss several of them, including dramatic changes in legal research, 
the proliferation of law clerks throughout the legal system, the growing docket of lower 
court judges, the growth of the administrative state, and the Supreme Court’s 
increasing embrace of judicial hierarchy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article will document and offer some explanations for the decline of 
what we call the common law style of judging, a way of approaching precedent 
and decisionmaking that once was fundamental to the American legal system. 
While we are not the first to suggest that common law judging is in decline,1 we 
back up this claim with original evidence of the changing behavior of trial judges 
vis-à-vis higher courts. In our view, the evidence of change is so striking—and 
the change potentially so consequential—that the subject merits considerably 
greater attention than it has received from scholars and practitioners until now. 
The common law style of judging is an approach that gives pride of place 
to precedent, but in a specific way: Occasionally, an individual precedent has 
the capacity to determine the outcome of numerous cases. But typically, it must 
be read and understood as part of a set of related precedents. Doctrine generally 
emerges not from a single decision, but rather from repeated efforts to grapple 
 
1 See Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 768 (2004) 
(arguing that “judicial discretion” at the federal and state levels is being supplanted “by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and their numerous state counterparts”); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization 
of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2007) (noting that American common law is 
“becoming increasingly textual” and less about what judges “think or . . . say during the proceedings 
before them” (emphasis omitted)). 
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with a particular problem. It therefore tends to develop incrementally. Because 
trials are the testing grounds of emerging doctrine, a central feature of common 
law judging is the willingness of trial judges to question the application of 
precedents that could lead to poor results. When trial judges resist the 
application of precedents from higher courts—for instance, by distinguishing a 
precedent or treating language in a higher court opinion as dicta—they, at least 
temporarily, slow the movement of the law in a particular direction and may 
succeed in diverting it down another path. Because trial judges hear so many 
more cases than appellate judges do, they as a group have tremendous potential 
to shape the law. But to what extent do they seize their opportunities to shape 
the law, and to what extent does the role that trial judges play today differ from 
the one they played in the past? These are the questions addressed by this study. 
In an earlier study, we considered lower court invocations of the holding–dicta 
distinction.2 We found that lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement 
from a higher court because it is dictum.3 Specifically, federal courts of appeals 
meaningfully invoke the distinction in about 1 in 4000 cases, federal district 
courts in about 1 in 2000 cases, and state courts in about 1 in 4000 cases.4 In this 
Article, we consider the more basic question of lower court adherence to 
precedent. We address this principally by analyzing U.S. district court judges’ 
treatment of precedents from the Supreme Court and courts of appeals across 
an eighty-year span. We conclude that today’s district court judges play a far less 
active role in shaping the law than their predecessors did. From 1932 to 1972, 
district court judges resisted a substantial proportion of higher court precedents. 
But since 1982, and especially over the past twenty years, they have become much 
more likely simply to follow the precedents they cite. 
This fundamental shift in lower court decisionmaking alters both the balance 
of authority and the practice of law in our federal system. In part, the demise of 
the holding–dicta distinction and the increasing uncritical reliance on higher 
court precedent suggest that district court judges see themselves as subordinates, 
not partners, in the legal policymaking enterprise. More than that, the causes of 
this shift are varied and enduring. The internet has fundamentally altered legal 
research, lower court judges have increasingly looked to law clerks to help them 
manage an ever-growing docket, the rise of big government has shifted 
lawmaking power away from courts and to lawmakers and regulators, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court increasingly has backed a hierarchical model of judging. 
 
2 See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision 
Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025 (2013) (setting out “the first systematic study of how 
lower courts treat higher court dicta”). 
3 Id. at 2036. 
4 Id. at 2041. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I highlights the central role of 
common law judging in the American system and notes recent questioning of 
its continued vitality. Part II, the heart of this Article, details our empirical 
study on district court citation practices. Part II also contains a discussion of 
other relevant empirical work, including our 2013 holding–dicta study and 
studies of federal courts of appeals’ adherence to Supreme Court precedent. 
These studies strengthen our conclusions about federal district court judges. 
They also suggest that our conclusions extend to the hierarchical relationship 
between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower-level appellate courts (federal 
courts of appeals and state appellate courts). Part III speculates on the causes 
of the decline of common law judging. It suggests that those causes are enduring, 
and, as such, common law judging is largely dead. Part III also considers the 
ramifications of our findings, including a snapshot of arguments defending and 
critiquing common law judging. 
I. COMMON LAW JUDGING AND THE  
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
“[T]he most significant feature of the common law,” Chief Justice 
Harlan Stone once observed, is “the fact that it is pre[e]minently a system 
built up by gradual accretion of special instances.”5 This image of fact-sensitive 
and incremental judging was once widely embraced.6 Consider this description 
of procedure from a legal scholar writing near the end of the nineteenth century: 
[Analogous] cases are scrutinized, classified, [and] distinguished . . . . [T]he 
decision in each case is a step in the growth of the law, a new datum for future 
reasoning. As this process goes on, fought over at every step by trained counsel 
and scrutinized by the court, there is a constant shaping of the law. A principle 
which lay vaguely in the cases takes a more definite form, its boundaries on the 
one side and the other are determined, and it becomes eventually as fixed and 
precise as a statutory enactment.7 
Under this view, as Karl Llewellyn put it, a “court can decide nothing but 
the legal dispute before it . . . . Everything . . . said in an opinion is to be read 
 
5 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1936). 
6 The common law system was inherited from England and provided the basis for the American 
judicial system. Even when statutes started playing a major role in the judicial system, the common law 
provided the base and background for disputes in the courts. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON 
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982) (noting that pre–New Deal codifications of the law “were 
so general that common law courts could continue to act pretty much as they always had”). 
7 Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common 
Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 182-83 (1891) (footnote omitted). 
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and understood only in relation to the actual case before the court.”8 This 
understanding is reflected in the concept of dicta. “It is not what the [higher 
court] intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the present judge, 
attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the 
determining classification.”9 In other words, the doctrine of dicta compels the 
judge deciding a case to make her “own decision.”10 
Precedents have also been understood as provisional. As Benjamin Cardozo 
wrote, the rule of adherence to precedent should be “relaxed” when a decision 
“has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social 
welfare.”11 Perhaps more telling, Llewellyn catalogued sixty-four possible 
ways to use precedent, including “[f]ollowing,” “[e]xpans[ion]” and 
“[r]edirect[ion],” and “[a]voidance.”12 “Not only does this selection provide 
judges and advocates with a ready-made tool kit for use in daily practice; it 
also persuasively demonstrates that courts are not controlled or dictated by 
prior authority.”13 
In this traditional view, lower courts “elaborate” on higher court precedent, 
reasoning by analogy and taking into account changing factual or policy 
developments.14 Correspondingly, lower courts’ common law power to disavow 
or limit higher court precedent allows lower courts to respond to “changed 
conditions” when “convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no 
longer sound.”15 Such resistance by the lower courts, moreover, is “often the 
only means of bringing the question anew to the attention of the appellate 
court, and thus affording opportunity for a correction of the blunder.”16 In the 
common law style of judging, trial judges play an active role in shaping legal 
 
8 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael 
Ansaldi trans., 1989) (emphasis omitted). 
9 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-3 (2013). 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921). 
12 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 77, 82, 84 
(1960); id. at 77-91. 
13 Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in 
the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 259 (1961). 
14 Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 665 (1995) (emphasis 
omitted); see also id. (outlining the “elaboration model” of jurisprudence under which lower court 
judges “elaborate” on extradoctrinal reasons for their decisions (emphasis omitted)). 
15 James Wm. Moore & Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of 
the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514, 539-40 (1943); see also id. at 515 (noting that “[n]o case is forever 
impregnable” and that “[n]o court can effectively command . . . obedience to a rule of law that departs 
too far from the norms of the times”). 
16 W.M. Lile, Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 VA. L. REV. 95, 101 (1916); see also id. at 105 
(noting that the common law should “mould and adjust itself to new needs and new conditions and 
thus, by constant growth, without haste but without rest, . . . keep pace with the enlightened public 
opinion of the people by whom and for whom it has been fashioned”). 
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policy. Indeed, with trial judges deciding many more cases than appellate 
judges, trial judges can often play the defining role in legal policymaking. 
Today, academic and other commentators increasingly call this picture into 
question, “expressing doubts . . . about federal courts fashioning law in the common 
law way.”17 They write that the common law has “contracted”18 and is in “rapid 
retreat.”19 There are different aspects to this perceived contraction and retreat, some 
of which we return to in Part III.20 The most relevant here is the perception that 
lower courts often accord greater authority to precedents or to specific language 
within those precedents than they are entitled to under the classical approach.21 For 
instance, Allison Larsen has shown that while lower courts frequently cite the 
Supreme Court for statements of empirical facts, appellate courts’ statements of 
facts about the world are not traditionally understood as part of the law.22 
Randy Kozel similarly has spoken of the “inclusive view” of precedent where 
even “[g]eneralized, sweeping, and unnecessary propositions commonly exert 
forward-looking effect.”23 Another manifestation of arguably excessive deference is 
lower courts’ willingness to treat nonessential “dicta” as binding “holdings,”24 
 
17 Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 
893 (2002). At the same time, some commentators suggest that the Supreme Court adheres to the 
common law tradition with respect to its own precedent, such that each generation refines past precedent 
to allow the Court to meet the demands of the current generation. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION 43-45 (2010) (defending common law constitutionalism as an alternative to originalism); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10-11 
(1999) (noting that the Supreme Court often issues narrow, minimalist decisions from which doctrine 
develops over time). For our purposes, the critical question is not whether the vitality of common law 
judging is tied to higher-court lower-court hierarchy; rather, our primary focus is on documenting and 
analyzing a shift in the importance of higher court precedent, which does not turn on accepting a 
particular view of common law judging. See Adam Rigoni, Common-Law Judicial Reasoning and Analogy, 
20 LEGAL THEORY 133, 134-35 (2014) (identifying different variations on common law judging). 
18 Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 737 (2012). 
19 Schauer, supra note 1, at 765. 
20 See infra Section III.A. 
21 By focusing on common law judging, our concern is lower court lawmaking and, with it, the 
vertical relationship between lower and higher courts. Our project does not speak to the question of 
district court authority to manage cases, including efforts to force settlements or otherwise eliminate 
the need to run trials and issue opinions. On this question, there is reason to think that district court 
judges are quite assertive—perhaps, in part, to manage an ever-exploding docket. See Arthur R. 
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 306 (2013) (showing that federal courts are 
increasingly disposing of cases prior to trial due to changes in “the judicial processing of civil cases”). 
For our discussion of the nexus between the decline of common law judging and docket size, see 
infra subsection III.A.3. 
22 See Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2013) (arguing that 
“lower courts . . . over-rely on Supreme Court opinions . . . to apply generalized statements of fact 
from old cases to new ones”). 
23 Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 198-99 (2014). 
24 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2026 (1994); see also Pierre N. 
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2006) (arguing 
that “[j]udges do more than put faith in [dicta]; [dicta] are often treated as binding law”); Judith M. 
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a practice that frees higher courts “from limits imposed by the facts and 
questions presented by a particular case, thus enabling them to set their own 
agenda and quasi-legislate.”25 
II. THE DEMISE OF COMMON LAW JUDGING 
Claims that lower courts increasingly treat higher court rulings as binding 
precedent are largely impressionistic and not specifically focused on the behavior 
of lower courts.26 Systematic investigations of lower court behavior are needed. 
In our earlier study of the holding–dicta distinction, we sought to fill that gap 
in the literature through a comprehensive investigation of how lower courts treat 
higher courts’ dicta. We found that lower courts rarely reached conclusions at 
odds with higher court rulings by invoking the holding–dicta distinction; this 
was not only true of federal and state courts, but also of both trial and lower-level 
appellate courts.27 In this study, we consider the related, more fundamental 
question of whether lower courts are willing to distinguish precedents or, 
instead, prefer an inclusive view of precedents, essentially seeking out ways for 
higher court precedent to bind them. We undertake a systematic examination of 
the practices of federal district court judges—in particular, their citations of higher 
court precedents. Our central questions are (1) to what extent district court judges 
assert their prerogatives to weigh the relevance of precedents and apply them with 
discrimination and (2) how much their willingness to assert these prerogatives has 
changed over time. 
District court judges constitute only one segment of the American bench, 
but they are the proper focus of this inquiry for several reasons. First, they 
are at the heart of the federal judicial system, having decided 350,462 cases in 
2013.28 It is hard to imagine a more important single set of trial courts anywhere. 
In the vast majority of cases, moreover, district courts are courts of last resort. 
In the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2015, 54,244 cases were commenced 
in U.S. courts of appeals, which is a small fraction—only 15.5%—of district court 
 
Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 221 (2010) (claiming 
that the “ratcheting up of persuasive law into binding law is problematic” because “[t]o the extent that 
courts treat dicta as holding, they are more likely to reach incorrect decisions, to exceed their judicial 
authority, and to generate illegitimate results”). 
25 Wistrich, supra note 18, at 768. In this way, the common law process is made more future-oriented 
in that “a later [lower] court permits the earlier [higher] court to determine the effect of the earlier 
court’s decision.” Id. 
26 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 23, at 198 (discussing lower courts’ expansive views of higher 
courts’ precedents); Leval, supra note 24, at 1250 (explaining the pervasive mistreatment of dicta as 
holding); Schauer, supra note 1, at 772 (observing the demise of common law judging). 
27 See Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2032-42 (showing how lower courts treat dicta). We will 
discuss those findings later in this Part. See infra text accompanying notes 80, 87, 9192. 
28 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 [https://perma.cc/J3J2-FDAJ]. 
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rulings in the previous year.29 “In short, whether and to what degree district 
judges” follow or break ranks from “their supervising appellate courts [including 
the U.S. Supreme Court] can broadly impact litigants, judges, lawyers, and the 
public in terms of actions, perceptions, and shaping the law.”30 
Second, good data is readily attainable for district courts going back many years; 
this is not true of many state courts.31 Finally, district courts have a clear status as 
lower courts, allowing for straightforward analyses of our questions. In contrast, 
federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are hybrids, acting as both 
precedent-setting higher courts and precedent-following lower courts. Indeed, it is 
not much of an overstatement to say that federal and state appellate courts are “the 
de facto (if not the de jure) venue for final appellate review.”32 There are very few 
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court each year and roughly eighty grants of 
certiorari.33 In October Term 2014, for example, the odds of a federal court of 
appeals decision being reviewed by the Supreme Court was approximately 1 in 
1000.34 In any case, for reasons we will explain later in this Part, we strongly suspect 
that our findings on federal district courts also hold for state courts’ and for federal 
courts of appeals’ treatment of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.35 
 
29 Id.; Table B-1. U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics During 12-Month Period 
Ending March 31, 2015, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9487/download [https://perma.cc/
NP2L-8BY4]. 
30 Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 113, 114 (2015); see also Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 848 (noting 
that lower federal courts, especially district courts, “perform the bulk of federal judicial work” and 
therefore should be the subject of empirical analysis). 
31 For cases decided prior to the late twentieth century, the extent and consistency with which 
they are included in Lexis and Westlaw databases is highly variable across states and across levels of 
court in the same state. 
32 VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 89 (2006). 
33 See Table A-1. Supreme Court of the United States (2009-2013), U.S. CTS., http://www.
uscourts.gov/file/14268/download [https://www.perma.cc/U7KT-H8JQ] (providing data about the 
cases on the Supreme Court’s docket). There are roughly 9000 petitions for certiorari each year—just 
under 2000 paid petitions and approximately 7000 in forma pauperis. Id. 
34 The Supreme Court heard sixty-seven appeals from federal courts of appeals (which decided 
54,000 cases during that same period). See Circuit Scorecard, SCOTUSBLOG, http://sblog.s3.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_scorecard_OT14.pdf [https://perma.cc/48V8-9Y2M];  
Table B-1. U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics During 12-Month Period Ending March 
31, 2015, supra note 29. Not surprisingly, relevant empirical studies find no evidence that fear of 
reversal drives appellate court decisionmaking. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 126 (2002) (reporting empirical findings that there is “little evidence 
that anticipatory decision making occurs and essentially no evidence that it results from fear of 
reversal”); Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal–Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 535, 557 (2011) (noting that “the handful of relevant empirical studies have failed to find 
evidence that fear of reversal drives lower court decisionmaking”). For additional discussion, see 
infra notes 79–80. 
35 As we show in Figure 1 infra, existing data on federal court treatment of Supreme Court precedent 
suggests increasing deference over time. With regard to state court practices, we did not independently 
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A. What’s at Stake? 
To better see what is at stake in this inquiry, let us compare two hypothetical 
legal systems. In the first, lower court judges invariably follow precedents that 
appear to bear on the cases before them. When there are conflicting precedents, 
they cite and follow the precedent that they think is more closely related to the 
case at hand and ignore the other. In the second system, lower court judges 
routinely question the applicability of precedents and regularly distinguish the 
cases before them from potentially relevant precedents. 
First consider the implications for individual cases. Judicial decisionmaking 
involves balancing the demands of justice in the individual case against the need 
for predictability in the law and uniformity in its application.36 A decision that 
relies on precedent without taking adequate account of the specific circumstances 
of the case at hand may not pass basic tests of fairness. On the other hand, a 
decision that gives too much weight to specific facts about the events or litigants 
in the case risks injustice of another kind, where two actions that are identical in 
the most important respects are nevertheless treated differently under the law.37 
At the level of the law writ large, the principal advantage of highly 
deferential lower court decisionmaking is predictability.38 If behavior of a 
certain sort continually produces victories for plaintiffs complaining about that 
behavior, people will know not to engage in it. That said, this is a somewhat 
crude kind of predictability that might leave potential litigants unsure about 
whether other somewhat similar behavior is also legally risky. Lower courts may 
make outcomes more predictable. When lower courts explicitly consider and 
reject the application of precedents, they explain why they think the precedents 
do not fit. In doing so, they offer ways of understanding the logic behind those 
precedents. The more they do to clarify that logic, the more guidance they 
provide to lawyers and potential litigants. 
 
code state court decisionmaking, and there is no data set that speaks to state court treatment of higher 
court precedent. At the same time, our earlier study of the holding–dicta distinction suggests that state 
courts no longer adhere to the traditional common law model. See Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2042-43 
(“[S]eeing a court disregard a significant statement from a higher court because it is dictum will literally 
be a once-in-a-lifetime experience.”). For additional discussion, see text accompanying note 87. 
36 For an incisive treatment of this subject, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992), which assesses the benefits of a legal system that focuses 
on justice in individual cases (standards) as compared to a system that provides ex ante instruction 
as to whether behavior is legal (rules). 
37 See Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 530, 534 (1999) (arguing that authoritative settlement solves coordination problems related 
to the uncertainty of knowing whether a legal ruling will apply in analogous cases). 
38 For this very reason, Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer argue that Supreme Court decisions 
should be deemed final and determinative in order to promote “stability.” See Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371, 1376-77 (1997) (stating 
that “an important . . . function of the law is the ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done”). 
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Perhaps more importantly, a high court’s first attempt to address a problem 
might sweep too broadly or simply be mistaken.39 Thoughtful pushback against 
the ruling from lower courts could prompt the high court to reexamine and 
improve it. Examples abound. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the New York 
Court of Appeals embraced a foreseeability of harm standard in product 
liability cases, responding to lower court dissatisfaction with the then-existing 
“inherently dangerous” standard.40 Specifically, lower courts would often find 
products to be inherently dangerous—so much so that it was impossible to 
discern the line separating “inherently dangerous” objects from objects that 
were part of “the ordinary intercourse of life.”41 In MacPherson, the Court of 
Appeals concluded both that the old rule was unworkable and that lower courts 
had established a foreseeability rule in its place.42 MacPherson then embraced 
and formalized what had been happening in the lower courts. 
Consider too how the U.S. Supreme Court responded in Continental T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania to lower court resistance to an earlier ruling.43 In that 
earlier ruling, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the Court had held that 
it was per se unreasonable under the Sherman Act “for a manufacturer to seek 
to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded 
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.”44 In Sylvania, the 
Court described what ensued this way: 
Since its announcement, Schwinn has been the subject of continuing 
controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal 
courts. The great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the decision, 
and a number of the federal courts confronted with analogous vertical 
restrictions have sought to limit its reach.45 
 
39 This is why judicial minimalists argue that the Supreme Court should issue “narrow” and 
“shallow” decisions that allow political actors and lower courts to help shape the development of law 
through a dialogue with the U.S. Supreme Court. SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 121; see also Neal Devins, 
The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1978 (1999) (book review) (concluding that 
Sunstein’s “call for narrow and shallow decision-making is sound in critical respects”). 
40 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson was written by then–New York Court of Appeals 
Judge Benjamin Cardozo; Cardozo is considered one of the great common law judges, and MacPherson 
is his most influential opinion. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 33 
n.1 (1990); see also LEVI, supra note 9, at 24. For an excellent summary of the evolution of the MacPherson 
standard and the role of lower court decisionmaking in that evolution, see David A. Strauss, The 
Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 852-57 (2007). 
41 Strauss, supra note 40, at 855. For a listing of lower court cases, see id. at 853-54. 
42 111 N.E. at 1054. For discussion, see Strauss, supra note 40, at 855-56. 
43 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
44 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967). 
45 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47-48 (footnote omitted). 
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Rather than faulting the lower courts for their recalcitrance, the Court went 
on: “In our view, the experience of the past 10 years should be brought to bear 
on this subject of considerable commercial importance.”46 
An examination of Shepard’s Citations between the time Schwinn was 
decided and 1976, the year before Sylvania, reveals that Schwinn was 
distinguished by lower courts more often than it was followed—thirty-five 
times versus twenty-three times. Among district courts specifically, it was 
distinguished nineteen times and followed sixteen times.  
A similar pattern of lower court response and Supreme Court reexamination 
appears in an important area of Fourth Amendment law. In United States v. 
Rabinowitz, federal agents carrying a concededly valid arrest warrant but no 
search warrant arrested a printer at his office.47 “[O]ver his objection [the 
agents] searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets in the office for about an hour 
and a half.”48 They found forged stamps, and Rabinowitz moved to suppress 
the evidence on the grounds that the search incident to arrest was too far-reaching 
to be reasonable.49 The Court upheld the search, pointing to some specific 
facts favoring admission of the evidence.50 However, the Court also employed 
more sweeping language.51 The Court stated, for instance, that the power to search 
an area following an arrest derived “not only from the acknowledged authority to 
search the person, but also from the longstanding practice of searching for other 
proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest.”52 
The courts of appeals appeared to be moderately comfortable with this 
broad reading of the arresters’ authority to search. According to Shepard’s 
Citations, they followed Rabinowitz thirteen times between 1950 and 1969, 
while distinguishing it five times. However, the district courts were notably 
resistant, distinguishing it seven times and following it only four times. The 
skeptical position won out in the end. The Supreme Court overruled 
Rabinowitz in 1969, holding that a search incident to arrest can extend only to 
“the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items.”53 
There is no way to know whether the lower courts’ resistance in any of these 
examples influenced the Supreme Court’s actions; perhaps the Court would 
have overruled the earlier decisions when it did even without prodding from 
the lower courts. Still, we have the Court’s own word that it paid attention to 
 
46 Id. at 48-49. 
47 339 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1950), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
48 Id. at 59. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 61. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
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the lower courts’ reactions to Schwinn.54 And even if we did not, it would be 
hard to imagine a high court simply ignoring all feedback from lower courts.55 
Assuming that high courts take note of lower courts’ feedback at least some of 
the time, critical responses to precedent at least give lower courts a chance to 
shape the path of the law, whereas acquiescence or even silent disapproval do not. 
In a system where trial judges frequently assert their prerogative to exercise 
independent judgment by distinguishing higher court precedent or invoking the 
holding–dicta distinction to limit its scope, they can importantly influence the 
direction in which and the speed with which the law develops. This, of course, 
is quintessential common law judging—the law evolves incrementally, sacrificing 
something of both speed and predictability in the hope of resting decisions on 
more solid ground.56 In contrast, when lower courts take an expansive view of 
precedent, they have a reduced ability to propose refinements to legal doctrine 
or to slow the pace at which it grows and solidifies. In such a system, law moves 
at the speed and with the shape dictated by higher courts; more errors and 
greater overbreadth are tolerated as the price for greater immediate certainty 
and more hierarchical control. 
The aim of this Article is to determine whether district courts adhere to 
the independent judgment or deference regimes and whether this has changed 
over time. We recognize at the outset that statements about precedents in 
 
54  Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1977) (footnote omitted). Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a 1985 federalism case, is another example of the Supreme 
Court overruling one of its decisions in the face of lower court criticism. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
Unlike the other cases examined in this Article, however, Garcia was not responding to lower court 
complaints that the earlier standard led to unjust results. The complaint, instead, was that the earlier 
standard was too difficult to apply faithfully. Specifically, Garcia overturned National League of Cities 
v. Usery, a 1976 decision holding that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce 
federal standards against the states in “areas of traditional government functions.” Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 540. But the meaning of 
“traditional government function” was elusive and subject to criticism for this very reason. This 
standard ultimately resulted in a patchwork of inconsistent lower court interpretations. In Garcia, the 
district court voiced what the Supreme Court dubbed a “common concern: ‘Despite the abundance 
of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are immune remains difficult.’” 469 U.S. at 
538 (quoting San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 447 (W.D. Tex. 1983)). 
Recognizing, moreover, that no alternative standard “appear[ed] manageable,” the Court concluded 
that it was fruitless to think “that case-by-case development would lead to a workable standard.” Id. 
at 540, 543. For commentary on the unworkability of Usery, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court 
Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1633 (1994) and Linda Greenhouse, 
Court Takes the Glow Off the 10th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1983, at E9. For commentary on 
difficulties faced by federal agencies in interpreting Usery, see NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 66-69 (2004). 
55 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 915 (2014) 
(examining the role of lower court precedent in U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking and observing 
that “[i]nvocations of support from the lower courts are not unusual, but neither are they routine”). 
56 For a general review of the origins and function of common law decisionmaking, see KYLE 
SCOTT, DISMANTLING AMERICAN COMMON LAW 1-14 (2007). 
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judicial opinions do not tell the whole story of how judges decide their cases. 
A judge who cites and follows several circuit court precedents might have ignored 
others that were inconvenient. By the same token, a judge’s decision to 
distinguish a precedent is not necessarily a powerful act of autonomy; it could 
be that just about everyone would agree that the cited case is irrelevant to the 
one being decided. Nevertheless, what judges say about precedents in their 
opinions is of great importance. Judges who silently evade precedents they 
do not like can make individual cases come out the way they want. But 
through their silence, they forfeit much of their power to influence the 
development of the law. And while a judge’s decision to distinguish a 
precedent might have no independent effect on the case outcome, the more 
often lower court judges decline to follow precedents from above, the more 
firmly they entrench a norm of independent judgment. 
B. Data 
Our analyses of judges’ treatments of precedents rely primarily on the 
coding in Shepard’s Citations.57 Beginning with 1932 and continuing with every 
tenth year until 2012, we randomly selected two hundred district court cases 
per year from all district court cases reported on Lexis, whether officially 
published or not.58 Data come from each case’s table of authorities, which 
indicates how each precedent cited in that case’s opinion was treated. So, for 
instance, our analysis of cases from 1932 reveals how courts in 1932 treated 
precedents they cited—not how cases decided in 1932 were treated later. 
The Shepard’s service assigns a code to every case mentioned in an 
opinion. By far, the most common code is “Citing,” indicating that the 
opinion in the case of interest mentioned another case but did not clearly 
apply it or engage in an analysis of its applicability. A few other codes, such 
as “Explaining,” are also used for neutral treatments, though only when a 
precedent is discussed more fully. “Citing” and the other neutral codes 
provide no useful information for our purposes. Our question is how often 
 
57 Like any coding endeavor, Shepard’s Citations have limitations, some of which we address 
below. But they are also unusually well-established and successful. In careful analyses of their 
validity and reliability, James Spriggs and Thomas Hansford have demonstrated that Shepard’s 
Citations have considerable value for scholars seeking to understand how courts respond to 
precedents. See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT 
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 46-50 (2006). See generally James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. 
Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The Reliability and Validity of Shepard’s Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 
327, 333-38 (2000). This is particularly true where, as here, researchers seek to make judgments about 
the judicial system as a whole rather than about individual cases. 
58 Lexis assigns each decision it reports a unique number in the format [Year] U.S. Dist. Lexis 
[Number]—for example, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46140. For our study, after identifying the set of available 
numbers for each year, we used a random number generator to choose two hundred of them. 
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judges refuse to follow a precedent that is arguably controlling. The neutral 
citation neither indicates that the precedent is arguably controlling nor tells 
us whether the judge thought it should be followed. Furthermore, including 
“Citing” in our analyses could produce seriously misleading results, for 
frequency of citation is a function of taste and practice, which change over 
time. In our data, district court judges cited an average of 0.8 court of appeals 
cases per opinion in 1932, 2.4 per opinion in 1982, and 6.8 per opinion in 2012. 
Many of the citations in later years are string citations. Including neutral 
citations in the baseline would cause us to underestimate contemporary 
district court judges’ willingness to choose resistance when it is an option. 
Therefore, we omit neutral citations from the analyses that follow. 
 There are two classes of citations included in our analyses. On the one hand 
are those coded as “Following” and flagged with a green symbol, indicating that 
the citing court treated the cited case as controlling precedent. On the other 
hand, there are Shepard’s codes that indicate at least some level of resistance to 
the application of a precedent. All such treatments are flagged with red or yellow 
symbols. Red-flagged treatments normally would be especially notable, as they 
indicate that the citing court refused to recognize the cited case as authoritative 
law. It turns out, though, that the few red-flagged treatments in our dataset are 
not meaningful. In each, the lower court noted that a precedent was no longer 
good law because it had been superseded by a statute or overruled by either the 
court that decided it or by a higher court. Although in such instances lower court 
judges refused to apply the precedents, they did not assert any independent 
authority to do so; they simply recognized that a higher authority had already 
nullified the precedent. Accordingly, we omit those cases from our analysis. In 
the end, then, all of the resisting treatments that we analyze are yellow-flagged. 
Those that appear in our dataset are defined by Shepard’s as follows: 
 
• Criticizing: “The citing opinion disagrees with the reasoning/result 
of the [cited] case . . . , although the citing court may not have the 
authority to materially affect its precedential value.”59 
 
• Distinguishing: “The citing case differs from the [cited] case . . . , either 
involving dissimilar facts or requiring a different application of the law.”60 
 
• Limiting: “[T]he citing opinion restricts the application of the [cited] 
case . . . , finding its reasoning applies only in specific, limited 
circumstances.”61 
 
 
59 See Alphabetical List of Shepard’s® Editorial Phrases, LEXISNEXIS, https://web.lexis.com/help/
research/shepeditorialmappings.htm [https://perma.cc/F2DU-PZAY]. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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• Questioning: “The citing opinion questions the continuing validity or 
precedential value of the [cited] case . . . because of intervening 
circumstances, including judicial or legislative overruling.”62 
C. Preliminary Analysis 
Overall, there are only 116 instances in our dataset of district court judges 
resisting the application of precedents from their courts of appeals.63 The vast 
majority of these, 100, distinguish the precedent. Of the remainder, thirteen are 
coded as questioning and one each as not following, limiting, and criticizing. There 
are 177 instances of district court judges distinguishing cases from the Supreme 
Court, along with seventeen questioning, five criticizing, and two limiting. 
To judge whether those numbers are large or small, we need to view them 
against a denominator, the total set of cases that district court judges treated as 
arguably controlling (that is, the sum of cases in the yellow-symbol categories 
listed above plus those cases coded by Shepard’s as “followed” and flagged with a 
green symbol). Let us begin with the two most recent years in our dataset, 2002 
and 2012. One hundred eighty times in those two years, district courts engaged in 
substantive discussions of the force and implications of Supreme Court decisions. 
On one of those occasions, the district court judge “criticized” the Supreme Court 
decision, according to Shepard’s. On another occasion, the precedent was 
“questioned,” and twenty-eight times the precedent was distinguished. On the 
other 150 occasions (83% of the total), the district court judge followed the 
Supreme Court precedent. Over the same two years, there were 291 substantive 
non-neutral treatments of cases from the district court judge’s controlling court of 
appeals. Of these, 268 followed precedent, twenty-two distinguished it, and one 
questioned the precedent. Thus, in 8% of the total treatments of circuit court cases, 
the district court judge resisted applying the precedent. 
A system in which judges raised doubts about most of the precedents they 
confronted would be woefully inefficient. And it would be strange to see since 
there is no good reason to expect judges to disagree so often with what other 
judges did before them. So even in a system where lower court judges acted with 
a great deal of autonomy, there would be nothing surprising about seeing 
resistance to precedents in only a minority of cases. That said, these results seem 
to indicate a notably high degree of deference in district court judges’ decisions, 
especially vis-à-vis precedents from their circuit courts. 
 
62 Id. 
63 In five instances, Shepard’s coded a case in the table of authorities as both distinguished and 
followed. For our purposes, a case should only be regarded as distinguished if the lower court refuses 
to treat it as authoritative. Therefore, after reading the cases to make sure that the higher court 
precedent was expressly followed, we recoded those as followed, not distinguished. 
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We can get a better sense of how notable these results are by tracing practices 
over time and determining whether they represent a change from past practices. 
As shown in Table 1, the results do, in fact, show quite a dramatic change. In the 
first part of our period, 1932 to 1972, district court judges typically resisted 
precedent in about half of all substantive treatments. (As in 2002 and 2012, the vast 
majority of the resisting treatments were distinguishing: 122 out of 135 for Supreme 
Court cases; 45 out of 55 for court of appeals cases.) By 1982 there was a clear shift 
toward even greater deference, a trend that accelerated markedly after 1992. 
 
Table 1: Federal District Court Treatments of Cited Precedents from Their 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and from the Supreme Court 
 
Year 
Resisting 
Circuit 
Following 
Circuit 
% 
Resisting 
Circuit 
Resisting  
Supreme 
Court 
Following 
Supreme 
Court 
% 
Resisting 
Supreme 
Court 
1932 8 10 44 35 23 60 
1942 8 4 67 24 17 59 
1952 9 8 53 18 15 55 
1962 13 6 68 25 24 51 
1972 17 13 57 32 37 46 
1982 14 23 38 18 40 31 
1992 21 56 27 19 67 22 
2002 16 110 13 23 65 26 
2012 10 157 6 7 85 8 
 
All 
Years 
116 387 23 201 373 35 
 
Note that this is not a matter of a change in the raw numbers of resisting 
treatments; district courts did not distinguish or question many more higher 
court decisions in earlier years. What changed is how often district courts relied 
on higher court decisions, especially from circuit courts, for guidance. In the 
earlier years, district court judges made their own decisions without much 
reference to higher courts, and when they did mention precedents from above, 
they were as likely to resist them as to go along with them. Opinions from more 
recent years give a much stronger impression of subordinates looking for 
direction from their superiors. 
We will explore explanations for this trend in the next Part. First, though, 
we turn briefly to two other sources of information about citations as a means 
of validating and refining the emerging picture. James Spriggs, with others, has 
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collected data on citations to every Supreme Court decision from 1791 to 2005.64 
Figure 1 displays annual citation data for both district courts and circuit courts 
from 1925 through 2005—specifically, resisting citations as a proportion of all 
citations either resisting or following. The pattern—steady and rather high 
rates of resisting treatments in early years, followed by a steep decline starting 
in the 1970s—is virtually identical for circuit court and district court citations 
to Supreme Court decisions. Correspondingly, potential causes of this decline 
discussed in Section III.A apply with equal force to courts of appeals and 
district courts.65 This enhances our confidence that what we are seeing is a 
systemic development. 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Resisting Citations to Supreme Court Among All 
Resisting or Following Citations, by Year and Level of Court 
 
 
 
 
64 See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use 
and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 520; Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most 
Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 430 (2010); James H. 
Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 
15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 326 (2007). 
65 These causes include changes in legal research, growing caseloads, increasing reliance on law 
clerks, the Supreme Court’s assertion of its status as law declarer, and the rise of the administrative 
state. See also infra notes 104–107 (noting the rise of federal court of appeals law clerks) and 109–111 
(describing the rise of federal court of appeals docket).  
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The second additional source comes from the West reporting service. 
(Shepard’s Citations are found in the Lexis reporting service.) West includes its 
own codes for treatments of precedents. On the one hand, unlike Shepard’s codes, 
these do not indicate whether a precedent was treated positively or negatively. 
On the other hand, they provide more information about how extensively a 
precedent was discussed. If Shepard’s Citations and our reading of the patterns 
they depict are accurate, we should find evidence in West’s codes that, over time, 
district court judges have paid more serious attention to decisions from higher 
courts, especially their courts of appeals. 
West’s KeyCite feature includes four codes for “[d]epth of treatment,” 
as follows:66 
 
• Examined (four stars): The citing case contains an “[e]xtended discussion of 
the cited case, usually more than a printed page of text.”67 
 
• Discussed (three stars): The citing case contains a “[s]ubstantial discussion of 
the cited case, usually more than a paragraph but less than a printed page.”68 
 
• Cited (two stars): The citing case contains “[s]ome discussion of the cited 
case, usually less than a paragraph.”69 
 
• Mentioned (one star): The citing case contains “[a] brief reference to the 
cited case, usually in a string citation.”70 
 
Because citations coded as “mentioned” can be utterly devoid of substance, 
we disregard them here. Figure 2 displays, by year and by cited court, the number 
of decisions cited, discussed, or examined per hundred citing decisions. So, for 
instance, we see that in 1932, about two hundred Supreme Court cases were cited 
with at least some discussion per 100 district court opinions (i.e., about two per 
opinion). What jumps out from the figure is the huge—roughly tenfold—growth 
in substantive references to a district court’s governing court of appeals from 1932 
to 2012. The number of references to “other,” meaning other federal circuits, state 
courts, or the district court itself, is also striking. In stark contrast to citations of 
the district court’s own circuit, these are present in large numbers throughout the 
entire time period. They even outnumber citations to U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions by quite a bit. 
  
 
66 See KeyCite Depth of Treatment Stars, WESTLAW, http://www2.westlaw.com/CustomerSupport/
Knowledgebase/Technical/WestlawCreditCard/WebHelp/KeyCite_Depth_of_Treatment_Stars.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F767-5WT2]. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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Figure 2: Number of Precedents Cited, Discussed, or Examined per 100 
District Court Opinions, by Precedent-Setting Court  
Figure 3 omits the “cited” category, narrowing the focus to precedents that 
received substantial enough treatment to be coded as “discussed” or “examined.” 
From 1932 to 1952, district courts appeared to pay virtually no attention to the 
decisions of their circuits; this neglect is especially apparent in comparison with the 
treatment of other courts. But by the end of the eighty-year period, the district’s 
circuit court has become the most important source of precedent. 
 
Figure 3: Number of Precedents Discussed or Examined per 100 District 
Court Opinions, by Precedent-Setting Court 
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 D. How Real Is the Change? 
Taken together, the data from Shepard’s and West’s KeyCite suggest basic 
changes in how district courts treat precedent, especially from their own 
circuits. But perhaps judges today approach higher court precedents similar 
to the way they did in the past, and it is something about the cases or the 
situations judges find themselves in that has changed. Investigating this will 
require more complex analyses that control for other variables. We turn to 
those now, focusing on citations to circuit courts where the change in behavior 
has been most dramatic. 
The first variable we control for is the age of the precedent at the time it was 
cited. Because of changes in social and economic conditions, values and beliefs, 
and other aspects of the law itself, precedents typically depreciate in value over 
time.71 This depreciation is reflected mainly in smaller numbers of both positive 
and negative citations as a precedent ages.72 Still, it seems plausible that among 
cited cases, depreciation might result in more negative treatments of older 
precedents. The number of cases decided annually by courts of appeals has 
grown tremendously over the last several decades.73 When courts of appeals 
decide more cases, the stock of recent precedents grows, and the average age of 
available precedents declines. For these reasons, greater deference over time—to 
circuit court decisions, at least—might simply reflect engagement with more 
youthful precedents. 
The second control variable is type of case. Criminal cases are often thought 
to be simpler on average than civil cases. Habeas corpus cases might be expected 
to be simpler still because the cost–benefit analysis for desperate prisoners 
militates strongly in favor of bringing petitions whenever possible, especially 
when the prisoners do not have to pay for counsel. In easy cases, judges and 
clerks may see less need for careful analysis of precedent and may content 
themselves with a few cursory supporting citations. Therefore, if criminal or, 
especially, habeas cases have come to make up a larger proportion of the total 
over time, that trend could help explain more deferential citation patterns.74 
 
71 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 263 (1976). 
72 HANSFORD & SPRIGGS II, supra note 57, at 53. 
73 From 1932 to 1962, there was modest growth in federal courts of appeals dockets (2950 cases 
to 4823 cases). U.S. Court of Appeals Caseload, 1892–2015, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_courts_of_appeals [https://perma.cc/J3WE-5USR]. In 1962, 4823 
cases were commenced in federal courts of appeals; in 1972, 14,535 cases were commenced; in 1982, 27,946 
cases were commenced; in 1992, 47,013 cases were commenced; in 2002, 57,555 cases were commenced; and 
in 2012, 57,501 cases were commenced. See id. 
74 To test for this possibility, we include variables indicating whether the case was a criminal 
prosecution or a habeas petition, with civil cases as the omitted baseline category. 
2017] The Vanishing Common Law Judge? 615 
Assuming that judges are more likely to question precedents that they disagree 
with and that the disagreement is, in part, a function of the presiding judges’ 
ideologies, then perhaps increasing deference to higher court decisions can be 
explained by decreasing ideological distance between precedent-setting courts and 
the judges considering those precedents. So, we include a control—albeit an 
imperfect one—for ideological distance between the deciding judge and precedent-
setting judges.75 Our measure is the proportion of judges in the majority on 
the precedent-setting panel who were appointed by a President of a different 
party from the President who appointed the district court judge.76 
Our final control variable is district court workload. District courts now 
handle more cases than they used to, and critically evaluating a precedent 
often takes more time than simply noting and following it.77 Therefore, it 
might be that changes in practice reflect narrower time constraints. Note that 
even if that were true, this would not mean that our findings of change are 
less real or consequential. However, it would mean that the older approach 
might still be alive in courts where caseloads are not so heavy and might 
reemerge in other courts if caseloads were to decline.78 
Before turning to the analyses, we note one variable that we do not control 
for here—circuit court caseloads. Although these caseloads have grown, they 
cannot explain the citation patterns we have described. One important reason 
why judges might defer to precedents is to avoid being reversed by a higher 
court.79 But reversing a district court requires more effort and attention from 
 
75 A 2016 study (that one of us co-authored) finds that judges are likely to reach consensus on 
disputes that divide the general public and law students. Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation 
Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 349, 410-11 (2016). The study, based on survey data of 253 judges, suggests that ideology is not 
a driver of lower court judicial decisionmaking. See id. at 349. 
76 For instance, if the district court judge analyzing a precedent was appointed by a Democratic 
President, the precedential case was unanimously decided, and two of the three circuit court judges 
participating in it were Republicans, the ideological distance score for that precedent treatment would 
be 0.67. We would prefer to employ Judicial Common Space scores, which contain more nuanced 
information on ideology. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 303 (2007). Unfortunately, these are not available for the entire period under study here. 
77 For additional discussion of the implications of district court workload to our study, see infra 
subsection III.A.3, which notes an inverse relationship between district court workload and the 
willingness of district court judges to distinguish higher court precedent. 
78 Philip Habel and Kevin Scott make a compelling case for workload measures that incorporate 
information about the types of cases being decided and the number of senior judges on a court who hear 
cases. See generally Philip Habel & Kevin Scott, New Measures of Judges’ Caseload for the Federal District 
Courts, 1964-2012, 2 J.L. & CTS. 153 (2014). Unfortunately, the dataset that they have made publicly 
available covers only a portion of the period studied here. Our measure, total cases commenced per active 
judge, is the next best available. Even this measure is not available for 1932; therefore, we present analyses 
including this measure but excluding 1932 cases, and including all years but excluding this measure. 
79 Fear of reversal is often mentioned as an important reason lower courts adhere to higher court 
rulings, including the refusal to invoke the holding–dicta distinction. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent 
and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 
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a circuit court than affirming does, so district court judges should, if anything, 
feel safer and see less need to defer as circuit courts’ workloads grow.80 The 
fact that deference to circuit court precedents has grown at the same time that 
circuit judges have become busier only deepens the mystery. 
 
Table 2: Logit Analysis of District Court’s Choice  
to Follow (0) or Resist (1) Precedent81 
 
Variable Coeff. 
St. 
Error 
Sig. Coeff. 
St. 
Error 
Sig. 
 
Year 
Decided 
 
-.042 .006 <.001 -.053 .009 <.001 
 
Precedent 
Age 
 
.000 .016 .99 .012 .015 .44 
 
Criminal 
Case 
 
-1.10 .558 .05 -1.22 .567 .03 
 
Habeas 
Case 
 
.439 .567 .44 .252 .692 .72 
 
Ideological 
Distance 
 
-.091 .372 .81 -.040 .381 .92 
 
Court 
Workload 
 
   -.001 .001 .24 
 
Constant 
 
83 13  104 17  
 
 
 
  N = 503   N = 482 
 
(1994) (relying on “anecdotal evidence” to conclude that lower court judges fear reversal on appeal). 
But see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 398 (2007) (“[I]t is unclear to 
what extent fear of reversal motivates district courts to comply with Supreme Court precedent.”). For 
reasons detailed in our study of the holding–dicta distinction and in other writings of ours, we 
question this “fear of reversal” rationale. Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2044-47. See generally David 
E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003). 
80 Our 2013 study of dicta revealed a similar phenomenon: lower courts were less willing to call 
out higher courts for nonbinding dicta at a time when there was less reason for lower courts to fear 
higher court reversal. See Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2044-47. 
81 The left-hand model includes cases from all years; the right-hand model does not include 
cases from 1932. All standard errors are robust, clustered by deciding judge. 
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Our analyses explain the outcome of whether a precedent was followed 
(0) or resisted (1), as defined earlier.82 The standard method for such an 
analysis is logistic regression, or logit. Table 2 displays the results from two 
analyses of district courts’ treatments of precedent. The left-hand column 
includes data from all of our years but only the first four control variables. 
The right-hand column includes all five control variables but not cases from 
1932 (recall that we could not calculate workload statistics for 1932).83 
The key results are for the “Year Decided.” In both models, they indicate that 
district court judges have become markedly less likely to resist precedent over 
time, even once we take into account characteristics of the judges and the cases 
they are deciding. Figure 4 displays, for each year, the estimated probability that 
a typical civil precedent will be resisted rather than followed. It shows, for 
instance, that the estimated probability of a resisting treatment declines from 
0.50 for a typical case decided in 1962 to 0.15 for a typical case decided in 2002. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probability that Cited Case Will Be Resisted, Given that 
It Is Either Resisted or Followed, by Year of Citing Case84 
 
82 See supra Section II.B. 
83 Some of the judges in our dataset decided multiple cases. To keep that data from exerting 
an undue influence on the results, we employ robust standard errors clustering on judges. 
84 From left-hand model in Table 2. Criminal and Habeas are set to zero. Precedent Age and 
Ideological Distance are set to their medians. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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One change over time that we have not yet considered is the increasing 
frequency with which district courts issue “unpublished” opinions. These 
opinions are fully available on Lexis and Westlaw but are not submitted to 
the Federal Supplement, the official case law reporter for the district courts. 
Since publication is often reserved for cases that present more important or 
more legally complicated issues, it could be that citation practices differ 
significantly between published and unpublished cases. If so, that would 
complicate the inferences to be drawn from our study. 
To test for this possibility, we determined whether each opinion from the 
three most recent years (1992, 2002, and 2012) was published in the Federal 
Supplement or not.85 We then re-ran the full analysis from the right-hand 
side of Table 2 and this time included a variable indicating whether the 
opinion was published or unpublished. The new variable had no effect on the 
treatment of precedent (coefficient = 0.04; standard error = 0.54; p>0.93). The 
greater deference apparent in district court judges’ opinions is not tied to 
whether those opinions are published or unpublished. 
Our results yield compelling evidence that something has changed in the 
way federal courts handle precedents from higher courts.86 We also anticipate 
that state practices have changed, for our earlier study of the holding–dicta 
distinction suggests no differences between state and federal practices. State 
courts only invoke the holding–dicta distinction to reach results at odds with 
higher court dicta in 1 in 4000 cases—numbers that match federal court 
practices.87 Moreover, our Part III discussion of the causes of changing district 
court practices applies to state courts as well as federal district courts.88 At the 
 
85 One hundred and thirty-four of the opinions in those years were published, and those cases 
yielded 140 citations either following or resisting circuit court precedents, so there are plenty of 
cases for comparison. 
86 We speak here of both federal district and court of appeals judges. While our study focuses 
on district judges, data on federal court of appeals citations of U.S. Supreme Court precedents also 
highlights increasing deference over time. See supra Figure 1. At the same time, we recognize that 
our discussion is one of aggregate trends and that some lower court judges—especially influential 
court of appeals judges—may continue to make use of common law methodology. At the same time, 
we recognize that our discussion is one of aggregate trends and that some lower court judges may 
continue to make use of common law methodology. One example may be Seventh Circuit Judge 
Richard Posner. According to his 1992–1993 law clerk Dan Klerman, Posner “told his clerks that the 
adverse precedents we thought we found were not binding on him, because he could distinguish the 
facts and ignore the adverse dicta on which we relied.” Email from Daniel M. Klerman to Neal E. 
Devins (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:47 PM) (on file with authors). 
87 Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2041. 
88 Most notably, changes in legal research are pervasive and state court judges both hear more 
cases and increasingly rely on law clerks. See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1987–2004, at 2 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/sco8704.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LDC-7HHE] (observing nationwide increases in state 
courts’ caseloads and hiring of law clerks); see also Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining 
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same time, we readily concede that one limitation of our study is that our 
sample is limited to cases in federal courts. State courts, being separately 
constituted and having different environments, may not be quite as deferential 
to the U.S. Supreme Court as are federal courts.89 
E. The Death of Common Law Judging? 
Our study presents compelling evidence of change in the treatment of 
precedent by federal court judges. At the same time, changes in the treatment 
of precedent do not necessarily evidence a fundamental change in judges’ 
understanding of their roles. As we will explain in Part III, increasingly 
deferential opinions could be, in part, a function of greater reliance on clerks 
and changing legal research practices.90 If that is true, then it might not be 
that district court judges care quite as much about higher courts as these 
findings suggest. That said, the findings of our study are so stark that we 
strongly suspect that judges’ role orientations have changed in a serious way. 
More to the point, these findings are significant whether or not they speak 
decisively to the question of changes in the judicial role. Whether district 
court judges actively engage in or simply acquiesce in contemporary practices, 
those practices matter. Judges’ opinions, as the only formal explanations of 
their decisionmaking, are the primary source of signals to other participants 
in the legal system about the approach district court judges are likely to take 
in future cases. The message those opinions are sending is, increasingly, that 
when it comes to precedent, our job is to find guiding language from higher 
courts, interpret it, and follow it—not to identify a set of sufficiently related 
decisions and tease out the legal principles underlying them. Capable 
attorneys are likely aware of those signals and may well structure their briefs 
and arguments accordingly, with the likely result that their actions—giving 
greater prominence to higher courts’ language—will reinforce the practices 
of the district courts. 
Our earlier study of the holding–dicta distinction tells a similar tale. With 
federal and state courts both refusing to rule against higher court dicta, 
lawyers have no incentive to call on lower courts to ignore higher court dicta. 
“For most lawyers,” as we noted in our study, “seeing a court disregard a 
 
the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 109 (2006) (explaining that the increase of law 
clerks for federal circuit court judges “increase[d] the appellate capacity of [those] courts”). 
89 See Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State 
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 800-01 (2009) (noting that state supreme courts 
“may be inclined to separate themselves from the federal system, thereby strengthening their position 
as major players in their respective state governments”). And naturally, our results do not allow for any 
inferences about how state trial courts treat the precedents of state intermediate and high courts. 
90 See infra subsections III.A.1–2. 
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significant statement from a higher court because it is dictum will literally be 
a once-in-a-lifetime experience.”91 Correspondingly, higher courts can issue 
sweeping rulings that address questions not immediately before them, 
knowing that lower courts will honor those statements and not treat them as 
nonbinding dicta. 
The combined lesson of our two studies is that, whether or not the deference 
evident in lower court judges’ opinions truly reflects their view of their place in 
the system, it limits their input into the law. In earlier days, when district court 
judges carefully evaluated a small set of higher court precedents and were not 
reluctant to argue that a precedent should not govern the present case, the 
distinctions and arguments they made directly shaped the law in the short-term 
and had the potential to influence its direction even in the long-term. In today’s 
typical opinion, where the primary function of citation is to identify guiding or 
supporting texts, the district court judge stands little chance of making an 
imprint on the law. Likewise, the refusal to invoke the holding–dicta distinction 
limits the ability of lower courts to limit the scope of higher court rulings and 
thereby shape the law. 
III. CAUSES AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECLINE  
IN COMMON LAW JUDGING 
Having found empirical evidence that traditional common law judging is 
on the wane, we will now explore the causes and ramifications of this 
fundamental change in judicial practices. Our aim is not to defend or attack 
common law judging. Many have debated whether a vertical hierarchical system 
or a horizontal one, where lower courts reshape the law by distinguishing higher 
court cases or deeming language in those cases nonbinding dicta, makes better 
legal policy. We will note some of those arguments when we identify the 
consequences of the shift.92 To start, we explore how the decline of common 
law judging tracks pervasive and seemingly permanent changes to our legal 
system, suggesting that the emerging style of judging we described may prove 
an enduring part of our legal landscape. 
A. Causes 
The changing practices of lower court judges and the related changes in 
the dynamic between lower and higher court judges are almost certainly tied 
to developments in the larger legal world. We describe five such 
developments: changes to legal research, increasing reliance of judges on law 
clerks, the growing docket of lower courts, the advent of the administrative 
 
91 Klein & Devins, supra note 2, at 2042. 
92 See infra Section III.B. 
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state and related rise of statutes, and efforts by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
perpetuate the judicial hierarchy model. While it is unclear how much each 
of these phenomena has contributed to the decline of common law judging 
individually, we feel certain that as a group they have played a large role in 
the shift towards hierarchy and away from common law decisionmaking. 
1. Legal Research 
Today’s lawyers are trained to do legal research by looking at keywords in large 
databases. The result is that lawyers spend far less time reading cases, and there is 
far less awareness of whether a case is truly governed by a higher court precedent. 
As Judith Stinson points out, lawyers emphasize “words over concepts”93: 
Holdings are rarely presented in neatly packaged statements. To determine 
the holding of a case, the reader must analyze the facts, issues, rationales, and 
result of that case. In contrast to the difficult task of determining a case’s 
holding, it is often easy to locate language in an opinion that, on its face, 
supports a particular position, even when the case itself does not stand for 
that proposition.94 
Electronic search services have made it even easier to search by language 
and less necessary to employ topically organized digests or Shepard’s to 
identify related cases. Electronic researchers “access a far greater number of 
cases on a wider array of topics” with the result that “fewer people read full 
cases,” understand precedents’ context in legal principles, are able to 
distinguish earlier cases, or discern holding from dicta.95 “Without an 
understanding of how the source fits into the broad context of legal analysis, 
the researcher is likely to focus more on the factual content of the 
information.”96 The logical result is what Peter Tiersma calls a “shift from legal 
reasoning to close reading,”97 an increased emphasis on finding and 
interpreting directive language from higher courts rather than analyzing and 
seeking to uncover the logic behind their actions. 
 
93 Stinson, supra note 24, at 253. 
94 Id. at 222 (footnote omitted). 
95 Larsen, supra note 22, at 74-76. 
96 Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 935 (2011). 
97 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 1189. 
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2. Judges’ Reliance on Law Clerks 
Judges increasingly rely on law clerks to write legal opinions.98 Cases 
deemed “nonprecedential” are often authored entirely by law clerks, and a law 
clerk may “insert a quotation from some precedential opinion that supports 
his or her judge’s argument without reading the entire opinion or considering 
its context.”99 It is widely thought that judges’ reliance on law clerks to write 
opinions has grown as the ratio of clerks to judges increases.100 Indeed, studies 
have found that the rise of law clerks has resulted in a dramatic upswing in the 
number of cited cases in judicial opinions. For example, the average number 
of citations in Supreme Court opinions grew from 9.2 to 12.9 after the Justices 
employed four (rather than two) law clerks.101 
Law clerks, of course, tend to be fresh out of law school, and most are 
twenty-six to thirty years old.102 Whether because of training or because they 
lack confidence, law clerks may feel a greater compulsion to find support in 
opinions from higher courts and may be more reluctant to challenge those 
opinions than judges would. The fact that clerks have had a larger hand in 
writing more recent opinions is almost surely one reason that the opinions 
exhibit more deference. 
It is telling that the rise of law clerks corresponds to the rise of deference in 
lower court opinions. District court judges were not even authorized to hire 
clerks until 1936, and universal access to them did not come for several more 
decades.103 “Since 1960, the approximate beginning of the ‘caseload explosion’ 
in the nation’s federal courts, the number of law clerks has increased at what 
some believe is an alarming rate.”104 Today, federal district court judges 
typically hire at least two clerks, court of appeals judges three clerks, and 
Supreme Court Justices four clerks.105 In contrast, before 1948, a district court 
judge could only hire one clerk and the number of clerks was “strictly 
 
98 See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
643, 665 (2015) (noting that “textual analysis, statements by judges, and even opinions themselves” 
reveal the role clerks play (footnotes omitted)); Todd C. Peppers et al., Inside Judicial Chambers: How 
Federal District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623, 635-36 (2008) 
(noting that “97% of the [federal district court judge] respondents stated that their law clerks review 
the relevant briefs and draft memoranda and orders regarding dispositive motions”); Albert Yoon, Law 
Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 131, 141-42 (2014) (citing 
studies showing that “law clerks are playing an increasingly larger role in the opinion-writing process”). 
99 See Masur & Ouellette, supra note 98, at 665-66. 
100 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 141 (1996). 
101 Cross et al., supra note 64, at 539-40. 
102 Yoon, supra note 98, at 141. 
103 Peppers et al., supra note 98, at 626-27. 
104 J. Daniel Mahoney, Foreword: Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 
326 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
105 Id. 
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limited.”106 By 2007, there were 2075 full-time law clerks at the federal district 
court level.107 
3. Explosion of Lower Court Docket 
The rise of the law clerk as junior varsity judge is closely linked to dramatic 
increases in the number of cases lower courts now decide. “Over the years, the clerk-
author has been accepted as somewhat of a necessary band-aid for an overworked 
judiciary. Echoing throughout the chambers of our courts are the cries and moans 
of docket strain.”108 Between 1970 and 1977, for example, there was a 35.2% increase 
in cases filed in federal court.109 For federal district courts, there have been dramatic 
increases in the number of cases, number of complex cases, and number of trials 
lasting over 30 days.110 Federal Judicial Center data reveals that there were 26,326 
civil cases filed in the federal district courts in 1932, increasing to 35,548 in 1952, 
69,444 in 1972, 167,909 in 1992, 220,844 in 2002, and 230,750 in 2012. In other words, 
almost nine times as many cases were filed in 2012 as were filed in 1932.111 Making 
matters worse, the number of judgeships has not substantially increased, and there 
is little political will to markedly overhaul the federal judiciary.112 Lower court 
judges, instead, must decide more and more cases every year. 
 
106 Id. at 325-26. The growth of law clerks at the federal courts of appeals is equally striking. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, court of appeals judges “could only hire a single law clerk per chambers, [but] 
the number rose to two in 1969 and three in 1979. At present, courts of appeals judges are authorized 
to hire four law clerks per chambers (if they forgo a second secretarial position), and these staff 
assistants are supplemented by approximately 500 staff attorneys spread across the federal appellate 
courts.” Todd C. Peppers et al., Surgeons or Scribes? The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law 
Clerks in “Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 315-16 (2014) (footnotes omitted). For information 
on the rise of law clerks at the state level, see supra note 88. 
107 Peppers et al., supra note 98, at 628. 
108 Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media Age, 
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 649 (1999). 
109 Marjorie Lakin & Ellen Perkins, Comment, Realigning the Federal Court Caseload, 12 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1001, 1002 n.5 (1979). 
110 See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case 
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 & n.1 (1981) (explaining that federal district 
court filings more than doubled between 1968 and 1980). For federal courts of appeals, there was an 
82.4% increase in filings between 1986 and 2004. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the 
United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1440 (2009). One study 
found that between 1960 and 2010, the circuit courts’ caseload increased by 1436%. WILLIAM M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS IN CRISIS 3 (2013). For information on state court docket growth, see supra note 88. 
111 See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/
page/caseloads_private_civil [https://perma.cc/D52T-EHM2]; see also Yoon, supra note 98, at 133-36 
(providing aggregate caseload statistics from 2000 through 2013 to show that over time, the federal 
judiciary’s “docket has steadily increased”). 
112 See Yoon, supra note 98, at 134, 147 (explaining that “the number of authorized judgeships 
grew only modestly” between 1900 and 2013 and concluding, “[b]ased on recent history, [that] the 
chances of an increase in judgeships are unlikely”). 
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This increasing caseload has resulted in federal judges both delegating to 
law clerks and adopting shortcuts to decisionmaking. And while many of these 
shortcuts are managerial—such as limiting published opinions and deciding 
appeals without oral argument—lower court judges are still left with less time 
to sort out the particulars of higher court rulings in order to distinguish those 
rulings or explain why language in them is nonbinding dicta. 
4. Rise of the Administrative State 
Starting with the New Deal, according to Guido Calabresi, “we have gone 
from a legal system dominated by the common law, divined by the courts, to one 
in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of 
law.”113 Over time, moreover, legislatures have written increasingly detailed 
statutes that bear more resemblance to the civil law than common law.114 Indeed, 
judges are not principally responsible for the interpretation of these statutes; that 
task, instead, falls to agencies.115 “Today, we have 2,840,000 federal workers in 15 
departments, 69 agencies and 383 nonmilitary sub-agencies. This exponential 
growth has led to . . . [a] shift of authority [that] has been staggering.”116 
Agencies have also grown at the state level: as of March 2012, there were 
5,286,000 state government employees as compared to 1,082,000 in 1953.117 
The rise of the administrative state, of course, means that lawmakers and 
agencies now make legal policy that was once made by courts exercising their 
common law power. More fundamentally, the administrative state cuts against 
common law decisionmaking in some basic ways. Lower courts may see the 
locus of governmental power as resting outside their purview and, relatedly, 
see the traditional process of distinguishing higher court precedent and 
invoking the holding–dicta distinction to be relics of a bygone era.118 In this 
 
113 CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 1. 
114 See Schauer, supra note 1, at 768 (noting various ways that judicial discretion in “both the 
state and federal systems” has been replaced by codification). 
115 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern 
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 100 (2000) (explaining 
that “agencies know they will retain authority to determine what their own law means”). 
116 Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-government/2013/05/24/
c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html [https://perma.cc/6UBD-4HG3]. Indeed, “a citizen 
is 10 times more likely to be tried by an agency than by an actual court.” Id. 
117 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 396 tbl.8.1 (2014), http://
knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Table%208.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TVR-32U9]. 
118 Even Guido Calabresi—who celebrates common law decisionmaking—recognizes that the 
reasons for “statutorification are too profound to be reversed” and that the courts will never again, in 
most instances, be “the primary makers of law.” CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 163. Correspondingly, 
the notion that the law’s development should be seen as policymaking was fueled by the rise of legal 
realism in the 1930s and its growing acceptance thereafter. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 1927–60, at 1 (1986); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) 
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way, lower courts further limit their lawmaking powers and look to others to 
shape legal policymaking through their decisions: most notably, higher courts. 
5. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Embrace of Judicial Hierarchy 
Another development, probably best understood as both a cause and effect, 
is a growing tendency to view the federal judiciary as a hierarchy in which lower 
court judges are “agents” of higher courts, with higher courts “set[ting] the policy 
that the lower courts should implement.”119 More broadly, in contemporary 
depictions of the legal policymaking process by commentators, jurists, and 
lawmakers, lower courts are seldom seen as partners in the process. The creative 
energy of legal policymaking is understood to reside in higher courts. Academic 
commentators increasingly see higher courts primarily as expounders of legal 
rules rather than dispute-resolvers that engage in minimalist decisionmaking 
and facilitate the development of legal principles “one step at a time.”120 
Although she calls this view into question, Pauline Kim maintains that it is 
“now commonplace for judicial politics scholars” to describe the federal courts 
this way.121 This is especially true of the Supreme Court, which is seen as 
departing “from the conventional model of appellate adjudication,” 
abandoning “the common law way,” and preferring, instead, to lay “down 
rules or standards that will control a large number of future cases”;122 seeking 
“to ensure and expand its hierarchical superiority in our judicial system” by 
embracing a “law declaration” model that focuses on legal issues of interest to 
the Court;123 and “functioning as a rule maker and legislature for other courts” 
rather than exercising “the ‘judicial power’ as traditionally understood.” 124 
 
(reviewing KALMAN, supra) (explaining that “[l]egal realism has fundamentally altered our 
conceptions of legal reasoning”). Unlike the common law (which embraced the idea of courts at all 
levels working together to refine “the law”), the administrative state and legal realism saw law as 
policy—something that could be distinguished and manipulated to pursue policy goals. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the “Legal Process,” 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2032-33 
(1994). Perhaps for this reason, as Jeff Pojonowski noted in comments on an earlier draft of this 
Article, lower courts came to eschew the common law method, worrying that “they lack[ed] the 
competence or legitimacy to engage in broad policymaking. Call it the Wile E. Coyote effect: once 
you look down and realize you are running on air, you fall.” Email from Jeffrey Pojanowski, Professor 
of Law, Notre Dame Law Sch., to Neal Devins (Oct. 25, 2015, 9:49 PM) (on file with authors). 
119 Kim, supra note 34, at 536. 
120 SUNSTEIN, supra note 17. 
121 Kim, supra note 34, at 535. 
122 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 31, 37 (2005). 
123 Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 665, 669 (2012). 
124 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal? The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the 
Nature of the Judicial Power, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 968 (2000). 
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Over the course of our empirical study (1932 to 2012) and especially since 
1989, the Supreme Court has increasingly embraced judicial hierarchy. Initially, 
the Court extensively used “error correction” to oversee the lower federal and 
state courts; in other words, rather than rule broadly, the Court operated in a 
more circumscribed way.125 This type of minimalist decisionmaking was very 
much in keeping with traditional common law decisionmaking. It arguably 
persisted through the 1960s.126 
By 1989, however, the Court seemingly embraced the view—advanced by 
Justice Scalia—that the “common-law, discretion-conferring approach is ill 
suited . . . to a legal system in which the supreme court can review only an 
insignificant proportion of the decided cases.”127 The Court instructed lower 
courts to “give some degree of respect to Supreme Court dicta if the Court 
dedicated sufficient consideration to such matters.”128 More tellingly, it 
reprimanded lower federal courts for “anticipatory overrulings” of precedents 
that they thought were outdated and no longer supported by the Supreme 
Court. In Rodriguez de Ouijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court ruled 
that lower courts were bound to follow Supreme Court precedent—even if the 
precedent “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of [Supreme 
Court] decisions” and that “the prerogative of overruling” belonged to the 
Supreme Court alone.129 
More recently, the Supreme Court has taken steps to secure its position 
atop the judicial hierarchy. Over the past several Terms, the Court has 
increasingly embraced the so-called “law declaration” model (where it sets the 
boundaries of Supreme Court adjudication) rather than the party-controlled 
“dispute resolution” model.130 Instead of adhering to the “adversarial myth,” 
 
125 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-47 
(2009) (describing the Supreme Court’s use of error correction during its early years “to ensure its 
status in the judicial hierarchy”). 
126 See Strauss, supra note 40, at 850-51 (describing the 1953–1969 Warren Court as a “common 
law” court). 
127 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
128 Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace Harms, 57 
DRAKE L. REV. 75, 104 (2008); see also Kozel, supra note 23, at 198 (noting that “[s]ome lower courts 
describe Supreme Court dicta as akin to Supreme Court holdings”). 
129 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Notwithstanding the bar on anticipatory overruling, the Justices 
sometimes signal to lower courts that they should limit past precedents. See Richard L. Hasen, 
Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move 
the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 797 (2012) (noting how lower courts use standing and other jurisdictional 
devices to work around precedent that the Supreme Court seems to disfavor); Richard M. Re, 
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedents from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 956-60 (2016) (discussing 
examples of how the Supreme Court has encouraged the narrowing of its previous decisions). 
130 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
859, 862-63, 890-92 (summarizing the academic debate regarding law declaration and dispute 
resolution models). See generally Monaghan, supra note 123 (exploring recent Supreme Court 
developments and linking them to increasing adoption of the law declaration model). 
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the Justices direct the parties to file supplemental briefs, appoint amici to 
argue issues not raised or briefed by the parties, and undertake independent 
internet searches to broaden the sweep of rulings based on their 
understandings of the relevant facts.131 The Court’s opinions also specify 
“exactly what the holding is in carefully crafted text that is meant to fetter the 
discretion of lower courts in the same way that a statute does.”132 By 
expanding its ability to have the final say on any “question capable of judicial 
resolution,” the Court makes clear that it stands atop the judicial pyramid and 
that all other courts must follow its lead.133 
The prevalence of this perception could certainly influence the understanding 
of district court judges themselves. Moreover, with the Court rejecting 
anticipatory overruling and otherwise limiting the boundaries of what lower 
courts can do, it seems highly probable that the Court’s increasing embrace of 
judicial hierarchy is causally related to the increasing refusals of trial courts to 
distinguish higher court precedent or invoke the holding–dicta distinction.134 
B. Ramifications 
If we and other scholars are reading these signs correctly, then a change 
in the relationship between lower and higher courts is underway. In 
particular, our findings highlight that district court deference to circuit courts 
has grown especially dramatically in the last few decades. Where once a court of 
appeals over a district court hardly seemed to play a role in district court judges’ 
decisionmaking, now it is cited more extensively and followed more frequently 
than the Supreme Court. This basic change in hierarchy strikes us as remarkable. 
Normatively, there is something to be said for either more or less deferential 
approaches to precedent. The primary advantage of highly deferential lower 
court judging is predictability. Most cases settle before trial, and most cases 
that are tried are never appealed. So for the vast majority of litigants (and 
potential litigants), the important behavior to predict is the trial judge’s. In a 
system where trial judges seldom reach decisions in tension with decisions of 
 
131 See Brian P. Goldman, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned 
Lower Court Decisions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 918-39 (2011) (surveying Supreme Court–appointed 
amici); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 53-68 (2011) (highlighting the consequences of appellate courts’ reliance on extra-record facts); 
Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2012) (noting 
the Justices’ use of internet searches). 
132 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 1188. 
133 Monaghan, supra note 123, at 730. Monaghan’s focus is on constitutional questions and how 
the Court now seeks out rather than avoids resolving unnecessary questions. Id. 
134 As Figure 1 supra reveals, federal courts of appeals increasingly follow Supreme Court 
precedent. At the same time, there are a handful of notable exceptions to this prevailing practice, 
including federal courts of appeals’ rulings on habeas corpus, gun control, and campaign finance. See 
Re, supra note 129, at 959-65. 
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higher courts, litigants will rarely have doubts about what they will do, at least 
in the many areas where higher courts have already spoken. For this very 
reason, Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer embrace judicial hierarchy, arguing 
that law’s principal function is to “settle [matters] authoritatively” and that 
higher courts can promote “[s]tability” through definitive judicial rulings.135 
Under this view, higher courts should settle contested legal issues, and both 
lower courts and elected officials should adhere to those rulings. 
On the other hand, change on such a scale should not be accepted 
uncritically, and there are reasons to question how desirable it is. For one thing, 
arguments for lower court obedience to higher courts principally speak to 
obedience to the U.S. Supreme Court, not district courts’ adherence to circuit 
courts. For example, Evan Caminker argues that the principal benefits of 
deference are that (a) the language and logic of Article III of the Constitution 
requires that “inferior” courts take a subordinate position to the “Supreme” 
Court and (b) consistent interpretation and application of the law are furthered 
by lower court deference to higher courts.136 The first of these justifications is 
specifically focused on the Supreme Court. The second justification has some 
application to federal appeals courts, for intra-circuit deference ensures intra-circuit 
uniformity. At the same time, such deference does little or nothing to promote 
the goals of consistency at the national level. 
There are other reasons that circuit court decisions might be entitled to 
less deference. Randy Kozel, for example, notes that intermediate appeals 
courts “make more interpretive errors than the Supreme Court,” for the 
Supreme Court benefits from “a circuit court’s reasoning . . . [and its own] 
light docket, as well as from the substantial attention its cases receive from 
interested parties who provide diverse perspectives in the form of amicus 
curiae briefs.”137 
More importantly, as this last point suggests, there may be reasons to worry 
about excessive deference to any higher court, whether a court of appeals or the 
Supreme Court. As we noted earlier, it is inevitable that judges will make 
mistakes, and indiscriminate adherence to precedent can entrench those 
mistakes.138 Mistakes may have become more likely over time as the world has 
 
135 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 38, at 1371, 1376. For a competing perspective, see generally 
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) 
for an argument that stability in the law is best achieved through a dynamic process in which other 
parts of government challenge Supreme Court rulings. 
136 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
817, 828, 855 (1994). See generally Grove, supra note 125 (making analogous arguments about higher court 
supremacy and, with it, the desirability of the Supreme Court issuing “maximalist” opinions). 
137 Kozel, supra note 23, at 228. The Supreme Court, too, “could observe the results [of lower 
court decisionmaking] and then, when the time comes, create national law in a more practically 
informed way.” Bruhl, supra note 55, at 874. 
138 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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grown more complex. When “the relevant facts are in flux and changing very 
rapidly, and the consequences of current developments are hard to foresee,” 
courts should limit their rulings, learn about the consequences of different legal 
holdings, and pursue an “empirically informed” jurisprudence.139 Even if not, as 
Mike Dorf has pointed out, in the same way that overly hierarchical private 
companies and government agencies can have trouble adapting to changes in the 
environment, a judicial system organized as a bureaucracy is less likely to keep 
pace.140 A dynamic system better allows for innovation since lower level 
decisionmakers are encouraged to experiment by challenging past practices.141 
Lower court judges’ assertions of independent judgment need not entail 
outright defiance of precedents from higher courts. Proponents of greater 
independence could still expect lower courts to faithfully follow the lead of 
higher courts in cases that clearly raise the same central question.142 But it is 
one thing to say that judges should respect controlling precedent; it is quite 
another to say that they should base their decisions primarily on—or at least 
justify those decisions primarily on the basis of—statements from higher 
courts of what the law is.143 Judges can respect precedent yet look beyond 
higher courts’ language to the facts and reasoning underlying their decisions. 
“By speaking clearly in some respects and leaving room for narrowing in 
others, higher courts can simultaneously tap into the advantages of both 
uniformity and disuniformity.”144 
More broadly, a fundamental goal of the legal system is to develop a sound 
body of law. All else equal, when more minds are brought to bear on a particular 
problem, a good solution is more likely to emerge. Assuming that lower court 
judges are typically capable and committed to the goal of developing sound law, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that the law will benefit from lower court judges 
bringing their independent judgment to questions of law and reporting even 
views that might be in tension with language or decisions of higher courts.145 
 
139 SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 174, 255; see also Strauss, supra note 40, at 858 (noting that a benefit 
of common law reasoning is that “[r]ather than trying to solve a problem by reasoning from abstractions, 
we are better off looking to see how people, over time, addressed that specific problem when it arose”). 
140 Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1998). 
141 See Strauss, supra note 40, at 858-59. 
142 Proponents of the traditional common law model often afford deference to higher court 
precedent that speaks to the precise legal issue, but they advocate that lower court judges should be 
willing to distinguish cases that raise similar but not identical issues. See Moore & Oglebay, supra 
note 15, at 539-40 (noting that precedent should be obeyed unless “clearly erroneous” in cases raising 
nearly identical issues so as to ensure “uniformity of treatment to litigants”). 
143 For a full-blown treatment of this question, see generally Kozel, supra note 23, which 
critiques the “inclusive” view of precedent. 
144 Re, supra note 129, at 947. 
145 For a general defense of common law decisionmaking on these sorts of pragmatic grounds, 
arguing that it yields efficient economic outcomes, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
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This is particularly true with respect to the dynamic between lower courts and 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Today’s Supreme Court now hears around eighty 
cases a year and, as such, there is increasing reason for “lower courts—operating 
individually and in conversation with each other”—to “fill in the details of the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal sketches” by fine-tuning legal rules “through the 
repeated application of overarching principles to specific facts.”146 
Correspondingly, litigants are entitled to receive individual attention and 
to have their cases decided on their own merits. Arguably, these aims are better 
served by considering the case-at-hand’s facts in light of the facts of previously 
decided cases—allowing the case-at-hand to be decided in a different way 
when the facts are sufficiently different rather than forcing it into a category 
neatly covered by a higher court’s statement of the law. This, of course, is the 
very logic of common law judging. Legal doctrine is not set by the first court 
to decide an issue. Rather, courts move cautiously and incrementally. Each 
new case, while evaluated in light of previously decided ones, is decided on its 
own merits. In theory, a series of such decisions will yield a refined principle 
or rule, resulting in fewer injustices and inefficiencies than would result if the 
first court’s approach were followed religiously in all similar cases. 
CONCLUSION 
We think it clear that the relationship between lower and higher courts is 
fundamentally transformed and that this transformation might signal the end 
of the common law style of judging. As our study demonstrates, there has 
been a basic shift in the dynamic between U.S. district courts and both the 
courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. In the first several decades 
covered in our study, district courts operated as traditional common law 
courts—distinguishing higher court precedent and placing their own imprint 
on legal policymaking. Over the past thirty years, however, district courts have 
become more and more deferential toward their superiors, with correspondingly 
less legal policymaking emanating from district courts. We also suspect that 
this transformation in lower court–higher court dynamics extends both to 
federal courts of appeals and state courts.147 This trend is buttressed by 
fundamental changes in the American legal system. The common law model 
does not fit comfortably in a world driven by statutes, regulations, millions of 
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147 For our discussion of federal courts of appeals, see supra notes 64–65. For our discussion of 
state courts, see supra notes 87–89. 
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government workers, the internet, keyword-driven legal research, and 
overworked courts that look to law clerks to write opinions. Instead, “[t]he 
common law developed as a concept in a smaller and [less complex] society.”148 
Furthermore, higher courts increasingly see themselves as superior and have 
taken steps both to limit party control and lower court discretion. 
The desirability of this basic change is another matter. It is not obvious to us 
whether it is better for lower courts to exercise their common law powers to update 
and correct legal standards or to embrace the values of consistency and stability 
that favor lower court deference. What we can say without qualification is that the 
hierarchical relationship between district court judges and higher courts has 
shifted dramatically over time, that this shift undoubtedly has important 
consequences, and that it demands more attention and critical evaluation. This 
Article, by identifying how the lower court–higher court dynamic has changed and 
examining why it has changed, is an important first step in this process. 
 
148 Schauer, supra note 1, at 781. 
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